Abstract. Confusion over the reporting and interpretation of results of commonly employed classical statistical tests is recorded in a sample of 1,645 papers from 12 psychology journals for the period 1990 through 2002. The confusion arises because researchers mistakenly believe that their interpretation is guided by a single unified theory of statistical inference. But this is not so: classical statistical testing is a nameless amalgamation of the rival and often contradictory approaches developed by Ronald Fisher, on the one hand, and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, on the other. In particular, there is extensive failure to acknowledge the incompatibility of Fisher's evidential p value with the Type I error rate, α, of Neyman-Pearson statistical orthodoxy. The distinction between evidence (p's) and errors (α's) is not trivial. Rather, it reveals the basic differences underlying Fisher's ideas on significance testing and inductive inference, and Neyman-Pearson views on hypothesis testing and inductive behavior. So complete is this misunderstanding over measures of evidence versus error that it is not viewed as even being a problem among the vast majority of researchers and other relevant parties. These include the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference, and those writing the guidelines concerning statistical testing mandated in APA Publication Manuals. The result is that, despite supplanting Fisher's significance-testing paradigm some fifty years or so ago, recognizable applications of Neyman-Pearson theory are few and far between in psychology's empirical literature. On the other hand, Fisher's influence is ubiquitous. 
2001; Grayson, Pattison, & Robins, 1997; Hyde, 2001; Macdonald, 1997; Nix & Barnette, 1998) . The varying levels of confusion exhibited in so many articles dealing with the meaning and interpretation of classical statistical tests points to the need to become familiar with their historical development. Krantz (1999) would surely agree with this assessment.
In light of the above concerns, the present paper addresses how the confusion between p's and α's came about. I do this by first reporting on the major differences in the structure of the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson schools of thought. In doing so, I typically let the protagonists speak for themselves. This is an absolute necessity given that their own names are conspicuously absent from the textbooks used to help teach psychologists about statistical methods. Because textbook authors almost uniformly do not cite and discuss Fisher's and Neyman-Pearson's respective contributions to the statistics literature, it is hardly surprising to learn that present researchers are not familiar with them. Second, I show how the competing ideas from the two camps have been inadvertently merged. The upshot is that although Neyman-Pearson theory claimed the mantle of statistical orthodoxy some fifty or so years ago (Hogben, 1957; LeCam & Lehmann, 1974; Nester, 1996; Royall, 1997; Spielman, 1974) , it is Fisher's influence which dominates statistical testing procedures in psychology today. Third, empirical evidence is gathered from a random sample of articles in 12 psychology journals for the period 1990-2002 detailing the widespread confusion among researchers caused by the mixing of Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson perspectives. This evidence is manifested in how researchers, through their misunderstandings of the differences between p's and α's, almost universally misreport and misinterpret the outcomes of statistical tests. They can scarcely help it, for such misreporting and misinterpretation is virtually sanctioned in the advice found in APA Publication Manuals (1994 Manuals ( , 2001 . The end result is that applications of classical statistical testing in psychology are largely meaningless. And this signals the need for changes in the way in which it is taught in the classroom. More specifically, hopes for eliminating (or at least drastically reducing) the mass confusion over the meanings of p's and α's must rest on acquainting students with the fundamentals of the historical development of Fisherian and NeymanPearson statistical testing. The present paper attempts to do this.
Comparing and Contrasting the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson Paradigms

Fisher's Paradigm of Significance Testing
Fisher's ideas on significance testing, popularized in the many editions of his widely influential books Statistical Methods for Research Workers (1925) and The Design of Experiments (1935a) , were enthusiastically received by practitioners. At the heart of his conception of inductive inference is what he termed the null hypothesis, H 0 . Although briefly dabbling with Bayesian approaches (Zabell, 1992) , Fisher quickly renounced the methods of inverse probability, or the probability of a hypothesis (H) given the data (x), Pr(H | x), instead championing the direct probability, Pr(x | H). In particular, Fisher used disparities in the data to reject the null hypothesis, that is, the probability of the data conditional on a true null hypothesis, or Pr(x | H 0 ). Consequently, a significance test is a means of determining the probability of a result, in addition to more extreme ones, on a null hypothesis of no effect or relationship.
In Fisher's model the researcher proposes a null hypothesis that a sample comes from a hypothetical infinite population with a known sampling distribution. As Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) comment, the null hypothesis is rejected 'if our sample statistic deviates from the mean of the sampling distribution by more than a criterion, which corresponds to alpha, the level of significance ' (p. 10) 1 In other words, the p value from a significance test is regarded as a measure of the implausibility of the actual observations (as well as more extreme and unobserved ones) obtained in an experiment or other study, assuming a true null hypothesis. The rationale for the significance test is that if the data are seen as being rare or highly discrepant under H 0 this constitutes inductive evidence against H 0 . Fisher (1966) noted that 'It is usual and convenient for experimenters to take 5 per cent as a standard level of significance, in the sense that they are prepared to ignore all results which fail to reach this standard' (p. 13). Thus, Fisher's significance testing revolves around the rejection of the null hypothesis at the p ≤ .05 level. If, in an experiment, the researcher obtains a p value of, say, .05 or .01 on a true null hypothesis, it would be interpreted to mean that the probability of obtaining such an extreme (or more extreme) value is only 5% or 1%. (Hence, Fisher is a frequentist, but not in the same sense as NeymanPearson.) For Fisher (1966) , then, 'Every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis' (p. 16).
In the Fisherian paradigm, an event is deemed established when we can conduct experiments that rarely fail to yield statistically significant (p ≤ .05) results. As mentioned earlier, Fisher considered p values from single experiments as supplying inductive evidence against the null hypothesis, with smaller p values indicating greater evidence (Johnstone, 1986 (Johnstone, , 1987b Spielman, 1974) . According to Fisher's famous disjunction, a p value ≤ .05 on the null hypothesis shows that either a rare event has occurred or else the null hypothesis is false (Seidenfeld, 1979) .
Fisher was sure that statistics could play a major role in fostering inductive inference, that is, drawing inferences from the particular to the general, from samples to populations. According to him, 'Inductive in-ference is the only process known to us by which essentially new knowledge comes into the world' (Fisher, 1966, p. 7) . But Fisher (1958) was wary that mathematicians (certainly Neyman) did not necessarily subscribe to his inductivist viewpoint:
In that field of deductive logic, at least when carried out with mathematical symbols, [mathematicians] are of course experts. But it would be a mistake to think that mathematicians as such are particularly good at the inductive logical processes which are needed in improving our knowledge of the natural world, in reasoning from observational facts to the inferences which those facts warrant. (p. 261)
Fisher never wavered in his belief that inductive reasoning was the chief mechanism of knowledge development, and for him the p values from significance tests were evidential.
Neyman-Pearson's Paradigm of Hypothesis Testing
The Neyman-Pearson (1928a , 1928b , 1933 statistical paradigm is widely accepted as the norm in classical statistical circles (Carlson, 1976; Hogben, 1957; LeCam & Lehmann, 1974; Nester, 1996; Oakes, 1986; Royall, 1997; Spielman, 1974) . Their work on hypothesis testing, terminology they preferred to distinguish it from Fisher's 'significance testing', was quite distinct from the latter's framework of inductive inference.
The Neyman-Pearson approach postulates two competing hypotheses: the null hypothesis (H 0 ) and the alternative hypothesis (H A ). In justifying the need for an alternative hypothesis, Neyman (1977) wrote:
. . . in addition to H [the null hypothesis] there must exist some other hypotheses, one of which may conceivably be true. Here, then, we come to the concept of the 'set of all admissible hypotheses' which is frequently denoted by the letter Ω. Naturally, Ω must contain H. Let H denote the complement, say Ω-H=H. It will be noticed that when speaking of a test of the hypothesis H, we really speak of its test 'against the alternative H.' This is quite important. The fact is that, unless the alternative H is specified, the problem of an optimal test of H is indeterminate. (p. 104) Neyman-Pearson considered Fisher's usage of the occurrence of rare or implausible results to reject H 0 to be an inadequate vehicle for hypothesis testing. Something more was needed. They wanted to see whether this same improbable outcome under H 0 is more likely to occur under a competing hypothesis. As Pearson later explained: 'The rational human mind did not discard a hypothesis until it could conceive at least one plausible alternative hypothesis' (E.S. Pearson, 1990, p. 82) . Even William S. Gosset ('Student', of t test fame), a man whom Fisher admired, saw the need for an alternative hypothesis. In response to a letter from Pearson, Gosset wrote that 'the only valid reason for rejecting any statistical hypothesis, no matter how unlikely, is that some alternative hypothesis explains the observed events with a greater degree of probability' (quoted in Reid, 1982, p. 62) . The inclusion of an alternative hypothesis by Neyman-Pearson critically distinguishes their approach from Fisher's, and this was an issue of great contention between the two camps over the years.
In Neyman-Pearson theory, the investigator selects a (typically point) null hypothesis and tests it against the alternative hypothesis. Their work introduced the probabilities of committing two kinds of error, namely false rejection (Type I error) and false acceptance (Type II error) of the null hypothesis. The former probability is called α, while the latter probability is called β.
Eschewing Fisher's ideas about hypothetical infinite populations, Neyman-Pearson results are predicated on the assumption of repeated random sampling from a defined population (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) . Therefore, Neyman-Pearson theory is best equipped for handling situations where repeated random sampling has meaning, such as in the case of quality-control experiments. In these narrow circumstances, the NeymanPearson frequentist interpretation of probability makes sense: α is the longrun relative frequency of Type I errors conditional on the null being true and β is the counterpart for Type II errors.
The Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing introduced the entirely new concept of the power of a statistical test. The power of a test, or (1-β), is the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis. Since the power of a test to detect a particular effect size in the population can be calculated before conducting the research, it is useful in the design of experiments. In Fisher's significance-testing scheme, however, there is no alternative hypothesis (H A ), making the ideas about Type II errors and the power of the test irrelevant. Fisher (1935b) pointed this out when rebuking Neyman and Pearson without naming them: 'In fact . . . "errors of the second kind" are committed only by those who misunderstand the nature and application of tests of significance ' (p. 474) . And he subsequently added:
The notion of an error of the so-called 'second kind,' due to accepting the null hypothesis 'when it is false' . . . has no meaning with respect to simple tests of significance, in which the only available expectations are those which flow from the null hypothesis being true. (Fisher, 1966, p. 17) Fisher denied the need for an alternative hypothesis, and strenuously opposed its incorporation by Neyman-Pearson (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Hacking, 1965) . Fisher (1966) , however, touches upon the concept of the power of a test when discussing the 'sensitiveness' of an experiment:
By increasing the size of the experiment we can render it more sensitive, meaning by this that it will allow of the detection of a lower degree of sensory discrimination, or, in other words, of a quantitatively smaller departure from the null hypothesis. Since in every case the experiment is capable of disproving, but never of proving this hypothesis, we may say that the value of the experiment is increased whenever it permits the null hypothesis to be more readily disproved. (pp. 21-22) And Neyman (1967) Neyman-Pearson theory, therefore, substitutes the idea of inductive behavior for that of inductive inference. According to Neyman (1971) :
The description of the theory of statistics involving a reference to behavior, for example, behavioristic statistics, has been introduced to contrast with what has been termed inductive reasoning. Rather than speak of inductive reasoning I prefer to speak of inductive behavior. (p. 1) And 'The term "inductive behavior" means simply the habit of humans and other animals (Pavlov's dogs, etc.) to adjust their actions to noticed frequencies of events, so as to avoid undesirable consequences' (Neyman, 1961, p. 148 ; see also Neyman, 1962) . Further defending his preference for inductive behavior over inductive inference, Neyman (1957) acknowledged his suspicions about the latter 'because of its dogmatism, lack of clarity, and because of the absence of consideration of consequences of the various actions contemplated ' (p. 16) . In presenting his decision rules for taking action A rather than B, Neyman (1950) emphasized that 'the theory of probability and statistics both play an important role, and there is a considerable amount of reasoning involved. As usual, however, the reasoning is all deductive' (p. 1).
The deductive character of the Neyman-Pearson model proceeds from the general to the particular. They came up with a 'rule of behavior' for selecting between two alternative courses of action, accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis, such that 'in the long run of experience, we shall not be too often wrong' (Neyman & Pearson, 1933, p. 291 ). Whether to accept or reject the hypothesis in their framework depends on the cost trade-offs involved with committing a Type I or Type II error. These costs are independent of statistical theory. They must be estimated by the researcher in the context of each particular problem. Neyman and Pearson (1933) After heeding such advice, the researcher would design an experiment to control the probabilities of the α and β error rates, with the 'best' test being the one that minimizes β subject to a bound on α (Lehmann, 1993) . In determining what this bound on α should be, Neyman (1950) later stated that the control of Type I errors was more important than that of Type II errors:
The problem of testing statistical hypotheses is the problem of selecting critical regions. When attempting to solve this problem, one must remember that the purpose of testing hypotheses is to avoid errors insofar as possible. Because an error of the first kind is more important to avoid than an error of the second kind, our first requirement is that the test should reject the hypothesis tested when it is true very infrequently. . . . To put it differently, when selecting tests, we begin by making an effort to control the frequency of the errors of the first kind (the more important errors to avoid), and then think of errors of the second kind. The ordinary procedure is to fix arbitrarily a small number α . . . and to require that the probability of committing an error of the first kind does not exceed α. (p. 265) Consequently, α is specified or fixed prior to the collection of the data. Because of this, Neyman-Pearson methodology is sometimes labeled the fixed α (Huberty, 1993) , fixed level (Lehmann, 1993) or fixed size (Seidenfeld, 1979) approach. This contrasts α with Fisher's p value, which is a random variable whose distribution is uniform over the interval [0, 1] under the null hypothesis. The α and β error rates define a 'critical' or 'rejection' region for the test statistic, say z or t > 1.96. If the test statistic falls in the critical region, H 0 is rejected in favor of H A , otherwise H 0 is retained (Goodman, 1993; Huberty, 1993) . Furthermore, descriptions of Neyman-Pearson theory refer to the rejection of H 0 when H 0 is true-the Type I error probability, α-as the 'significance level' of a test. As we shall see below, calling the Type I error probability the significance level of a statistical test was something quite unacceptable to Fisher. It has also helped to create enormous confusion among researchers concerning the meaning and interpretation of 'statistical significance'.
Recall that Fisher regarded his significance tests as constituting inductive evidence against the null hypothesis in single experiments (Johnstone, 1987a; Kyburg, 1974; Seidenfeld, 1979) . Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests, on the other hand, do not permit an inference to be made about the outcome of any individual hypothesis that the researcher is examining. Neyman and Pearson (1933) were unequivocal about this: 'We are inclined to think that as far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based upon the theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that hypothesis ' (pp. 290-291) . But since scientists are in the business of gleaning evidence from individual studies, this limitation of Neyman-Pearson theory is acute. Nor, for that matter, does the NeymanPearson model allow an inference to be made in the case of ongoing, repetitive studies. Thus, Grayson, Pattison and Robins (1997) were incorrect when they stated that 'one implication of a strictly frequentist [NeymanPearson] approach is that we can only make inferences on the basis of a long run of repeated trials' (p. 68). Neyman-Pearson theory is strictly behavioral; it is non-evidential in both the short and long runs. As Neyman (1942) wrote: 'it will be seen that the theory of testing hypotheses has no claim of any contribution to . . . "inductive reasoning" ' (p. 301). Fisher (1959) recognized this, commenting that the Neyman-Pearson 'procedure is devised for a whole class of cases. No particular thought is given to each case as it arises, nor is the tester's capacity for learning exercised' (p. 100). Instead, the investigator is only allowed to make a decision about the likely outcome of a hypothesis as if it had been subjected, as Fisher (1956) observed, to 'an endless series of repeated trials which will never take place' (p. 99). In the vast majority of applied work, repeated random sampling does not occur; empirical findings are usually limited to a single sample.
Fisher conceded that Neyman and Pearson's contribution, which he referred to as an 'acceptance procedures' approach, had merit in the context of quality-control decisions. For example, he acknowledged: 'I am casting no contempt on acceptance procedures, and I am thankful, whenever I travel by air, that the high level of precision and reliability required can really be achieved by such means' (Fisher, 1955, p. 69) . This concession aside, Fisher (1959) was resolute in his objections to Neyman-Pearson ideas about hypothesis testing as an appropriate method for guiding scientific research:
The 'Theory of Testing Hypotheses' was a later attempt, by authors who had taken no part in the development of [significance] tests, or in their scientific application, to reinterpret them in terms of an imagined process of acceptance sampling, such as was beginning to be used in commerce; although such processes have a logical basis very different from those of a scientist engaged in gaining from his observations an improved understanding of reality. (pp. 4-5) He insisted that . . . the logical differences between [acceptance procedures] and the work of scientific discovery by physical or biological experimentation seem to me so wide that the analogy between them is not helpful, and the identification of the two sorts of operation is decidedly misleading. (Fisher, 1955, pp. 69-70) In further distancing himself from Neyman-Pearson methodology, Fisher (1955) drew attention to the fact that:
From a test of significance, however, we learn more than that the body of data at our disposal would have passed an acceptance test at some particular level; we may learn, if we wish to, and it is to this that we usually pay attention, at what level it would have been doubtful; doing this we have a genuine measure of the confidence with which any particular opinion may be held, in view of our particular data. From a strictly realistic viewpoint we have no expectation of an unending sequence of similar bodies of data, to each of which a mechanical 'yes or no' response is to be given. What we look forward to in science is further data, probably of a somewhat different kind, which may confirm or elaborate the conclusions we have drawn; but perhaps of the same kind, which may then be added to what we have already, to form an enlarged basis for induction. (p. 74)
The above discussion shows that Fisher and Neyman-Pearson disagreed vehemently over both the nature of statistical methods and their approaches to the conduct of science per se. Indeed, ongoing exchanges of a frequently acrimonious nature passed between Fisher and Neyman-Pearson as both sides promulgated their respective conceptions of statistical analysis and the scientific method.
Minding One's p's and ␣'s
Users of statistical techniques in the social and medical sciences are almost totally unaware of the distinctions, described above, between Fisher's ideas on significance testing and Neyman-Pearson thoughts on hypothesis testing (Gigerenzer, 1993; Goodman, 1993 Goodman, , 1999 Huberty, 1993; Royall, 1997) . This is through no fault of their own; after all, they have been taught from numerous well-regarded textbooks on statistical methods. Unfortunately, many of these same textbooks combine, without acknowledgement, incongruous ideas from both the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson camps. This is something that both sides found appalling. Ironically, as will be seen, the end result of this unintentional mixing of Fisherian with Neyman-Pearson ideas is that although the latter's work came to be accepted as statistical orthodoxy about fifty years ago (Hogben, 1957; Spielman 1974) , it is Fisher's methods that flourish today. As Royall (1997) Johnstone (1986) and Keuzenkamp and Magnus (1995) maintain that statistical testing usually follows Neyman-Pearson formally, but Fisher philosophically. For instance, Fisher's notion of disproving the null hypothesis is taught along with the Neyman-Pearson concepts of alternative hypotheses, Type II errors and the power of a statistical test. In addition, textbook descriptions of Neyman-Pearson theory often refer to the Type I error probability as the 'significance level' (Goodman, 1999; Kempthorne, 1976; Royall, 1997) .
But the quintessential example of the bewilderment caused by the forging of Fisher's ideas on inductive inference with the Neyman-Pearson principle of inductive behavior is the widely unappreciated fact that the former's p value is incompatible with the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test in which it has become embedded (Goodman, 1993) . Despite this fundamental incompatibility, the end result of this mixing is that the p value is now indelibly linked in researchers' minds with the Type I error rate, α. And this is precisely what Fisher (1955) had earlier complained about when he accused Neyman-Pearson of attempting 'to assimilate a test of significance to an acceptance procedure' (p. 74). Because of this assimilation, much empirical work in psychology and the social and biological sciences proceeds in the following manner: the investigator states the null (H 0 ) and alternative (H A ) hypotheses, the Type I error rate/significance level, α, and presumably-but rarely-calculates the statistical power of the test (e.g. t). These steps are in accordance with Neyman-Pearson convention. After this, the test statistic is computed for the sample data, and in an effort to have the best of both worlds, an associated p value (significance probability) is calculated. The p value is then erroneously interpreted as a frequency-based 'observed' Type I error rate, α (Goodman, 1993) , and at the same time as an incorrect (i.e. p < α) measure of evidence against H 0 .
The p Value as a Type I Error Rate
Even staunch critics of, and other commentators on, statistical testing in psychology occasionally commit this error. Thus Dar et al. (1994) noted: 'The sample p value, in the context of null hypothesis testing, is involved . . . in determining whether the predetermined criterion of Type I error, the alpha level, has been surpassed' (p. 76). Likewise, Meehl (1967) misreported that the investigator 'gleefully records the tiny probability number "p < .001," and there is a tendency to feel that the extreme smallness of this probability of a Type I error is somehow transferable' (p. 107, my emphasis).
Nickerson (2000) also makes the mistake of drawing a parallel between p values and Type I error rates: 'The value of p that is obtained as the result of NHST is the probability of a Type I error on the assumption that the null hypothesis is true' (p. 243). He later goes on to compound this mistake by adding: 'Both p and α represent bounds on the probability of Type I error . . . p is the probability of a Type I error resulting from a particular test if the null hypothesis is true' (p. 259, my emphasis). Here, Nickerson misinterprets a p value as an 'observed' Type I error rate, something which is impossible since the latter applies only to long-run frequencies, not to individual instances. Neyman (1971) expressed this as follows:
It would be nice if something could be done to guard against errors in each particular case. However, as long as the postulate is maintained that the observations are subject to variation affected by chance (in the sense of frequentist theory of probability), all that appears possible to do is to control the frequencies of errors in a sequence of situations. (p. 13)
The p value is not a Type I error rate, long-run or otherwise; it is a measure of inductive evidence against H 0 . Type I errors play no role in Fisher's paradigm.
This misinterpretation of his evidential p value as a Neyman-Pearson Type I error rate severely upset Fisher, who was adamant that the significance level of a statistical test had no ongoing sampling interpretation. With regard to the .05 level, Fisher (1929) early on warned that this does not mean that the researcher 'allows himself to be deceived once in every twenty experiments. The test of significance only tells him what to ignore, namely all experiments in which significant results are not obtained ' (p. 191) . The significance level, for Fisher, was a measure of evidence for the 'objective' disbelief in the null hypothesis; it had no long-run frequentist characteristics.
Again, Fisher (1950) Seidenfeld (1979) exposed the difference between the two schools of thought on this crucial matter:
. . . such a frequency property has little or no connection with the interpretation of the [Fisherian significance] test. To repeat, the correct interpretation is through the disjunction, either a rare event has occurred or the null hypothesis is false. (p. 79) In highlighting the discrepancies between p's and α's, Gigerenzer (1993) Despite the above cautions about p values not being Type I error rates, it is sobering to note that even well-known statisticians such as Barnard (1985) , Gibbons and Pratt (1975) and Hinkley (1987) nevertheless make the mistake of equating them. Yet, as Berger and Delampady (1987) warn, the interpretation of the p value as an error rate is strictly forbidden:
P-values are not a repetitive error rate . . . A Neyman-Pearson error probability, α, has the actual frequentist interpretation that a long series of α level tests will reject no more than 100α% of true H 0 , but the datadependent-P-values have no such interpretation. (p. 329) At the same time it must be underlined that Neyman-Pearson would not endorse an inferential or epistemic interpretation of statistical testing, as manifested in a p value. Their theory is behavioral, not evidential, and they would likewise complain that the p value is not a Type I error rate.
It should therefore be pointed out that in his effort to partially resolve discrepancies between the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson programs, Lehmann (1993) similarly fails to distinguish between measures of evidence versus error. He refers to the Type I error rate as the significance level of the test, when for Fisher this was determined by p values and not α's. And we have seen that misconstruing the evidential p value as a Neyman-Pearson Type I error rate was anathema to both Fisher and Neyman-Pearson.
The p Value as a Quasi-measure of Evidence Against H 0 (p < α)
While the p value is being erroneously reported as a Neyman-Pearson Type I error rate, it will be interpreted simultaneously in an incorrect quasiFisherian manner as evidence against H 0 . If p < α, a statistically significant finding is announced, and the null hypothesis is disproved. For example, Leavens and Hopkins' (1998) declaration that 'alpha was set at p < .05 for all tests' (p. 816) reflects a common tendency among researchers to confuse p's and α's in a statistical significance testing framework. Clark-Carter (1997) goes further in this regard by invoking the great man himself: 'According to Fisher, if p were greater than α then the null hypothesis could not be accepted' (p. 71). Fisher, of course, would have taken umbrage at such a statement, just as he would have with Clark's (1999) assertion that 'in Fisher's original work in agriculture, alpha was set a priori' (p. 283), with Huberty (1993, p. 328) and Huberty and Pike's (1999, p. 11) suggestions that Fisher encouraged the use of α = .05, with Cortina and Dunlap's (1997) recommendation to compare observed probabilities with predetermined α cut-off values, and with Chow's (1996) error of investing his (Fisher's) tests with both p's and α's. Fisher had no use for the concept α. Again, in an otherwise thoughtful article titled 'The Appropriate Use of Null Hypothesis Testing', Frick (1996) nonetheless makes the mistake of using p's and α's interchangeably: 'Finally, the obtained value of p is compared to a criterion alpha, which is conventionally set at .05 . . . When p is less than .05, the experimenter has sufficient empirical evidence to support a claim' (p. 385).
In addition, Nickerson (2000) , who earlier misinterpreted a p value as a Type I error rate, follows Frick (1996) in ascribing an evidential meaning to the p value when it is directly compared with this error rate:
A specified significance level conventionally designated α (alpha) serves as a decision criterion, and the null hypothesis is rejected only if the value of p yielded by the test is not greater than the value of α. If α is set at .05, say, and a significance test yields a value of p equal to or less than .05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the result is said to be statistically significant at that level. (Nickerson, 2000, pp. 242-243) Nix and Barnette (1998) do likewise in a paper subtitled 'A Review of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing': 'As such, p values lower than the alpha value are viewed as a rejection of the null hypothesis, and p values equal to or greater than the alpha value are viewed as a failure to reject ' (p. 6 ).
Yet we have seen that interpreting p values as evidence against the null hypothesis in a single experiment is impossible in the Neyman-Pearson framework. Their approach centers on decision rules with a priori stated error rates, α and β, which are limiting frequencies based on long-run repeated sampling. If a result falls into the critical region, H 0 is rejected and H A is accepted, otherwise H 0 is accepted and H A is rejected (Goodman, 1993; Huberty, 1993) . Interestingly, this last claim contradicts Fisher's (1966) remark that 'the null hypothesis is never proved or established, but is possibly disproved, in the course of experimentation' (p. 16). In the Neyman-Pearson framework one can indeed 'accept' the null hypothesis. Neyman's (1942) advice makes this plain:
. . . we may say that any test of a statistical hypothesis consists in a selection of a certain region, w 0 , in the n dimensional experimental space W, and in basing our decision as to the hypothesis H 0 on whether the experimental point EЈ, determined by the actual observations, falls within w 0 or not. If it does, the hypothesis H 0 will be rejected, if it does not, it will be accepted. (p. 303, my emphasis) Note, then, the distinctly Fisherian bent adopted by Wilkinson and the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference (1999) when they recommend: 'Never use the unfortunate expression "accept the null hypothesis" ' (p. 599). To reiterate, this advice is at odds with, ostensibly, Neyman-Pearson statistical convention.
Further Confusion over p's and α's
In the Neyman-Pearson decision model the researcher is only allowed to say whether or not the result fell in the critical region, not where it fell, as might be indicated by a p value. Thus, if the Type I error rate, α, is fixed at its usual .05 value before (as it must be) the study is carried out, and the researcher subsequently obtains a p value of, say, .0014, this exact value cannot be reported in a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test (Oakes, 1986) . This is because, Goodman (1993 Goodman ( , 1999 explains, α is the probability of a set of possible results that may fall anywhere in the tail area of the distribution under the null hypothesis, and we cannot know in advance which of these particular results will arise. This differs from the tail area for the p value, which is known only after the result is observed, and which, by definition, will always lie exactly on the border of that tail area. Consequently, a predetermined Type I error rate cannot be conveniently renegotiated as a measure of evidence after the result is observed (Royall, 1997 Goodman (1993, p. 489) calls 'roving alphas', whereby p values are assigned a limited number of categories of Type I error rates, such as p < .05, p < .01, p < .001, and so on. As mentioned earlier, and elaborated below, a Type I error rate, α, must be fixed before the data are collected, and any ex post facto reinterpretation of values like p < .05, p < .01, and so on, as variable Type I error rates applicable to different parts of any given study is strictly inadmissible.
Why Must α Be Fixed Before the Study is Carried Out?
At this juncture it is helpful to be reminded why it is necessary to fix α prior to conducting the study, rather than allow it to be flexible (like a p value), and how the failure to do so has tainted researcher behavior. Alpha must be selected before performing the study so as to constrain the Type I error rate to some agreed-upon level. In specifying α in advance, Neyman (1977) admitted that in their efforts to build a frequentist theory of testing hypotheses, he and Pearson were inspired by the French mathematician Borel's advice that:
. . . (a) the criterion to test a hypothesis (a 'statistical hypothesis') using some observations must be selected not after the examination of the results of observation, but before, and (b) this criterion should be a function of the observations 'en quelque sort remarquable'. (p. 103) Royall (1997, pp. 119-121) addresses the rationale for prespecifying α, and I paraphrase him here. Suppose a researcher decides not to supply α ahead of time, but waits instead until the data are in. It is decided that if the result is statistically significant at the .01 level, it will be reported as such, and if it falls between the .01 and .05 levels, it will be recorded as being statistically significant at the .05 level. In the Neyman-Pearson model, this test procedure is improper and yields misleading results, namely, that while H 0 will occasionally be rejected at the .01 level, it will always be rejected any time the result is statistically significant at the .05 level. Thus, the research report does not have a Type I error probability of .01, but only .05. If the prespecified α is fixed at the .05 level, no extra observations can legitimize a claim of statistical significance at the .01 level. This, Royall (1997) points out, makes perfect sense within Neyman-Pearson theory, although no sense at all from a scientific perspective, where additional observations would be seen as preferable. And this deficiency in the Neyman-Pearson paradigm has encouraged researchers, albeit unwittingly, to incorrectly supplement their testing procedures with 'roving alpha' p values.
The Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing program strictly disallows any 'peeking' at the data and (repeated) sequential testing (Cornfield, 1966; Royall, 1997) . Cornfield (1966, p. 19 ) tells of a situation he calls common among statistics consultants: suppose, after gathering n observations, a researcher does not quite reject H 0 at the prespecified α = .05 level. The researcher still believes the null hypothesis is false, and that if s/he had obtained a statistically significant result, the findings would be submitted for publication. The investigator then asks the statistician how many more data points would be necessary to reject the null. And, in Neyman-Pearson theory, the answer is no amount of (even extreme) additional data points would allow rejection at the .05 level. As incredible as this answer seems, it is correct. If the null hypothesis is true, there is a .05 chance of its being rejected after the first study. As Cornfield (1966) remarks, however, to this chance we must add the probability of rejecting H 0 in the second study, conditional on our failure to do so after the first one. This, in turn, raises the total probability of the erroneous rejection of H 0 to over .05. Cornfield shows that as the n size in the second study is continuously increased, the significance level approaches .0975 (= .05 + .95 × .05). This demonstrates that no amount of collateral data points can be gathered to reject H 0 at the .05 level. Royall (1997) puts it this way: 'Choosing to operate at the 5% level means allowing only a 5% chance of erroneously rejecting the hypothesis, and the experimenter has already taken that chance. He spent his 5% when he tested after the first n observations' (p. 111). But once again, despite being in complete accord with Neyman-Pearson theory, this explanation runs counter to common sense. And once again, researchers mistakenly augment the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis-testing model with Fisherian p values, thereby introducing a thicket of 'roving' or pseudoalphas in their reports.
Further confounding matters, these variable Type I error 'p' values are also interpreted in an evidential fashion. This happens, for example, when p < .05 is deemed 'significant', p < .01 is 'highly significant', p < .001 is 'extremely significant', and so on. Goodman (1993 Goodman ( , 1999 and Royall (1997) caution that because of its apparent similarity with the Neyman-Pearson Type I error rate, α, Fisher's p value has been subsumed within the former's paradigm. As a result, the p value has been contemporaneously interpreted as both a measure of evidence and an 'observed' error rate. This has created extensive confusion over the meaning of p values and α levels. Unfortunately, as Goodman (1992) warned, . . . because p-values and the critical regions of hypothesis tests are both tail area probabilities, they are easy to confuse. This confusion blurs the division between concepts of evidence and error for the statistician, and obscures it completely for nearly everyone else. (p. 897)
Fisher, Neyman-Pearson and the .05 Level
Finally, it is ironic that the confusion surrounding the differences between p's and α's was inadvertently fueled by Neyman and Pearson themselves. This occurred when they used, for convenience, Fisher's 5% and 1% significance levels to help define their Type I error rates (E.S. Pearson, 1962 Neyman-Pearson. And Fisher (1959) criticized them for doing so, explaining that 'no scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which from year to year, and in all circumstances, he rejects hypotheses; he rather gives his mind to each particular case in the light of his evidence and his ideas ' (p. 42) . No wonder that many researchers confuse Fisher's evidential p values with Neyman-Pearson behavioral error rates when both concepts are ossified at the 5% and 1% levels.
Confusion Over p's and α's: APA Publication Manuals
Adding fuel to the fire, there is also ongoing confusion and equivocation over the interpretation of p values and α levels in various APA Publication Manuals. I noted previously that a prespecified Type I error rate (α) cannot be simultaneously viewed as a measure of evidence (p) once the result is observed. Yet this mistake is actively endorsed as official policy in an earlier APA Publication Manual (1994):
For example, given a true null hypothesis, the probability of obtaining the particular value of the statistic you computed might be [p =] .008. Many statistical packages now provide these exact [p] values. You can report this distinct piece of information in addition to specifying whether you rejected or failed to reject the null hypothesis using the specified alpha level.
With an alpha level of .05, the effect of age was statistically significant, F (1, 123) = 7.27, p = .008. (p. 17) And psychologists are provided with mixed messages by statements such as: 'Before you begin to report specific results, you should routinely state the particular alpha level you selected for the statistical tests you conducted: [for example,] An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests' (APA, 1994, p. 17) . This is sound advice that is congruent with Neyman-Pearson principles. However, it is immediately followed with some poor advice: 'If you do not make a general statement about the alpha level, specify the alpha level when reporting each result ' (p. 17) . This recommendation promotes unsound statistical practice by virtually sanctioning the habitual use of untenable 'roving alphas'. Such a situation, whether applied to actual α's or (more likely) p values, is completely unacceptable: α must be determined prior to, not after, data collection and statistical analysis.
The latest APA Publication Manual (2001) , following on the heels of the report of Wilkinson and the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference (1999), continues in a similar vein. Like its 1994 predecessor, for instance, the 2001 Manual distinguishes the two types of probabilities associated with statistical testing, p and α (although both editions incorrectly call the p value a likelihood when it is a probability). But the new version likewise proceeds to dispense erroneous counsel:
The APA is neutral on which interpretation [p or α] is to be preferred in psychological research. . . . Because most statistical packages now report the p value . . . and because this probability can be interpreted according to either mode of thinking, in general it is the exact probability (p value) that should be reported. (APA, 2001, p. 24, my emphasis) But this is not the case. The p value is not a Type I error rate, and an α level is not evidential. The Manual goes on to declare:
There will be cases-for example, large tables of correlations or complex tables of path coefficients-where the reporting of exact probabilities could be awkward. In these cases, you may prefer to identify or highlight a subset of values in the table that reach some prespecified level of statistical significance. To do so, follow those values with a single asterisk (*) or double asterisk (**) to indicate p < .05 or p < .01, respectively. When using prespecified significance levels, you should routinely state the particular alpha level you selected for the statistical tests you conducted:
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. (p. 25) Such recommendations are misleading to authors. Just after being told to present exact, data-dependent, p values wherever feasible, we are also instructed to use both p values and α levels to indicate prespecified (yet variable) levels of statistical significance. This virtually obligates the researcher to consider a p value as an 'observed' Type I error rate.
This obligation is all but cemented in another passage, where two examples are given:
Two common approaches for reporting statistical results using the exact probability formulation are as follows:
With an alpha level of .05, the effect of age was statistically significant, F (1,123) = 7.27, p < .01.
The effect of age was not statistically significant, F (1, 123) = 2.45, p = .12.
The second example should be used only if you have included a statement of significance level earlier in your article. (p. 25) Note that the first example uses p and α interchangeably, as if they are the same thing. Moreover, p < .01 is not an exact probability. Example two, which does use an exact probability, implies that such probabilities cannot be used without first announcing an 'overall' significance level-a prespecified α-to which all others bow. This is not the case.
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Because some statisticians, some quantitative psychologists and APA Publication Manuals are unclear about the differences between p's and α's, it is to be expected that confusion levels among psychologists in general will be high. I assess the magnitude of this confusion in a sample of APA journals.
Confusion Over p's and ␣'s: Empirical Evidence
An empirical investigation was made of the way in which the results of statistical tests are reported in the psychology literature. In particular, a randomly selected issue of each of 12 psychology journals-the American Psychologist Table 1 shows that this examination produced a sample of 1,750 empirical papers, of which 1,645, or 94%, used statistical tests. There is some variability in the percentage of empirical papers using statistical testing, with a low of 40% for AP, and a high of 99.2% for JAbP. Moreover, six of the journals (DP, JAbP, JCCP, JEP, JExPG and JPSP) had in excess of 95% of their published empirical works featuring such tests.
Even though the Fisherian evidential p value from a significance test is at odds with the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis-testing approach, Table 2 reveals that p values are ubiquitous in psychology's empirical literature. In marked contrast, α levels are few and far between.
Of the 1,645 papers using statistical tests, 1,090, or 66.3%, employed 'roving alphas', that is, a discrete, graduated number of p values interpreted variously as Type I error rates and/or measures of evidence against H 0 , usually p < .05, p < .01, p < .001, and so on. In other words, these p values are sometimes viewed as an 'observed' Type I error rate, meaning that they are not pre-assigned, or fixed, error levels that would be dictated by Neyman-Pearson theory. Instead, these 'error rates' are incorrectly determined solely by the data. Finch et al. (2001) found that these were used in 77% of empirical articles in the JAP for the period 1955 to 1999, and in almost 100% of such articles in the British Journal of Psychology for 1999. They concluded: 'Typical practice is to report relative p values using two or more implicit alpha levels, most commonly .05 and .01 and sometimes .001 ' (p. 198, my emphasis) . Interestingly, however, they are not critical, as they should be, of this custom of interpreting p values as Type I error rates. Gigerenzer (1993) , on the other hand, most certainly is. When discussing how p values are usually reported in the literature-p < .05, p < .01, p < .001-he observes: 'Neyman and Pearson would have rejected this practice: These p values are not the probability of Type I errors . . .
[values] such as p < .05, which look like probabilities of Type I errors but aren't' (p. 329).
Further clouding the issue, these same p values will be interpreted simultaneously in a quasi-evidential manner as a basis for rejecting H 0 if p < α. This includes, in many cases, mistakenly using the p value as a surrogate measure for effect sizes (e.g. p < .05 is 'significant', p < .01 is 'very significant', p < .001 is 'extremely significant', etc.). In short, these 'roving alphas' can assume a number of incorrect and contradictory interpretations.
After the 'roving alphas,' an additional 54 (3.3%) papers reported 'exact' p values, and a further 384 (23.3%) presented various combinations of exact p's with either 'roving alphas' or fixed p values. Conservatively, therefore, some 1,474, or 89.6% (i.e. 'roving alphas' plus the combination of exact p's and 'roving alphas'), of empirical articles in a sample of psychology journals report the results of statistical tests in a fashion that is at variance with Neyman-Pearson convention. At the same time they violate Fisherian theory, as when p values are misinterpreted as both Type I error rates and as quasi-Fisherian (i.e. p < α) measures of evidence against the null.
Another 6 (0.4%) studies were insufficiently clear about the disposition of a result in their accounts (other than comments such as 'This result was statistically significant'). I therefore assigned them to the 'Unspecified' category.
Thus, 111 (6.7%) studies remain eligible for the reporting of 'fixed' level α values in the manner intended by Neyman-Pearson. However, 88 of these 111 studies reported 'fixed p' rather than fixed α levels. After subtracting this group, a mere 23 (1.4%) studies remain eligible. Of these 23 papers, 7 simply refer to their published results as being 'significant' at the .05, .01, levels, and so on, but provide no information about p values and/or α levels. In the final analysis, only 16 of 1,645 empirical papers using statistical tests, or 1%, explicitly used α levels. 
Discussion
Confusion over the interpretation of classical statistical tests is so universal as to render their application almost meaningless. This ubiquitous confusion among researchers over the meaning of p values and α levels is easier to understand when it is pointed out that both expressions are used to refer to the 'significance level' of a test. But their interpretations are poles apart. The level of significance expressed by a p value in a Fisherian significance test indicates the probability of encountering data this extreme (or more so) under a null hypothesis. This p value does not pertain to some prespecified error rate, but instead is determined by the data, and has epistemic implications through its use as a measure of inductive evidence against H 0 in individual studies. Contrast this with the significance level called α in a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. Here, the emphasis is on minimizing Type II, or β, errors (i.e. false acceptance of a null hypothesis) subject to a bound on Type I, or α, errors (i.e. false rejections of a null hypothesis). Moreover, this error minimization applies only to long-run repeated sampling from the same population, not to single experiments, and is a directive for behaviors, not a way of gathering evidence. Viewed from this perspective, the two notions of 'statistical significance' could hardly be more distant in meaning. And both the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson camps, as has been shown repeatedly throughout this paper, were keenly aware of these differences and attempted, in vain as it turns out, to communicate them to research workers. These differences are summarized in Table 4 . Yet these distinguishing characteristics of p's and α's are rarely spelled out in the literature. On the contrary, they tend to be used equivalently, even being compared with one another (e.g. p < α), especially in statistics textbooks aimed at applied researchers. Usually, in such texts, an anonymous account of standard Neyman-Pearson doctrine is put forward initially, and is often followed by an equally anonymous discussion of 'the p value approach'. This transition from α levels to p values (and their intermixing) is typically seamless, as if it constituted a natural progression through different parts of the same coherent statistical whole.
Of course, a cynic might argue so what if researchers cannot correctly distinguish between the meanings of p's and α's. S/he may ask just exactly how the confusion over p's and α's has impeded knowledge growth in the discipline. But surely continued, misinformed statistical testing cannot be justified on the grounds that its pernicious consequences are difficult to isolate. Another line of argument that might be adopted by those seeking to maintain the status quo with regard to statistical testing could be that in their interchangeable uses of p values and α's, researchers are simply picking and choosing from the 'best parts' of the (unstated) Fisherian and NeymanPearson paradigms. Why should a researcher, one might say, feel obligated to use only one or the other of the statistical testing methods? It might be thought that employing an α level here and a p value there does no damage. But these kinds of rationalizations of improper statistical practice do not wash. The Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson conceptions of statistical testing are incommensurate. The researcher is not at liberty to pick and choose, albeit unintentionally, from two incompatible statistical approaches. Yet the crux of the problem is that this is precisely what the overwhelming majority of psychology (and other) researchers do in their empirical analyses. For example, it would be surprising indeed to learn that the author(s) of even a single article from among the 1,645 examined in our sample consciously planned to analyze the data from both the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian perspectives. The proof of the pudding is seen in the fact that the unawareness among researchers of the distinctions between these perspectives is so ingrained that using p's and α's interchangeably is not perceived as even being a problem in the first place. The foregoing account illustrates why Nickerson's (2000) statement that 'reporting p values is not necessarily inconsistent with using an α criterion' (p. 277) is incorrect. Contrary to respectively) , a p value is not a bound on α, nor is α a decision criterion for p. Fisher and Neyman-Pearson themselves would have denied such assertions, for they continue to cause trouble.
While not writing about the confusion regarding p's and α's per se, Tryon's (1998) comments over general misunderstandings of statistical tests by psychologists are relevant here:
. . . the fact that statistical experts and investigators publishing in the best journals cannot consistently interpret the results of these analyses is extremely disturbing. Seventy-two years of education have resulted in miniscule, if any, progress toward correcting this situation. It is difficult to estimate the handicap that widespread, incorrect, and intractable use of a primary data analytic method has on a scientific discipline, but the deleterious effects are undoubtedly substantial. (p. 796) I share Tryon's sentiments.
Conclusions
Among psychology researchers, the p value is interpreted simultaneously in Neyman-Pearson terms as a deductive assessment of error in long-run repeated sampling situations, and in a Fisherian sense as a measure of inductive evidence in a single study. Such distinctions notwithstanding, the mixing of measures of evidence (p's) with measures of error (α's) is standard practice in the classroom and in scholarly journals. Because of this, statistical testing is largely devoid of meaning-a p and/or α value can mean almost anything to the applied researcher, and hence nothing. Furthermore, this mixing of ideas from both schools of thought has not been evenhanded. Paradoxically, while the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis-testing framework began supplanting Fisher's views on significance testing half a century ago, this is not evident in journal articles. Here, it is Fisher's legacy that is omnipresent.
Despite trenchant criticism of classical statistical testing (e.g. Schmidt, 1996; Thompson, 1994a Thompson, , 1994b Thompson, , 1997 , 3 following the recommendations of Wilkinson and the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference (1999), and the continued coverage given to it in the latest APA Publication Manual (2001), it appears that such testing is here to stay. My advice to those who wish to continue using these tests is to be more deliberate about their application. At the very least, researchers should purposely determine whether their concerns are with controlling errors or collecting evidence. If the former, investigators should adopt a Neyman-Pearson approach to guide behavior, but one which makes a serious attempt to estimate the likely costs associated with Type I and II errors. Researchers choosing this option should discontinue using 'roving alphas' and the like, and stick with fixed, preassigned, α's. If the focus of a study is more evidential in nature, the use of Fisher's p value would be more appropriate, preferably in its exact format so as to once more avoid the 'roving alphas' dilemma.
For myself, I see little of value in classical statistical testing-whether of the p's or α's variety. A better route for assessing the reliability, validity, and generalizability of empirical findings is to establish systematic replication with extension research programs focusing on sample statistics, effect sizes and their confidence intervals Hubbard, 1995; Hubbard, Parsa, & Luthy, 1997; Hubbard & Ryan, 2000; Thompson, 1994b Thompson, , 1997 Thompson, , 1999 Thompson, , 2002 . But that is another story. Nickerson (2000, pp. 261-262) calls 'linguistic ambiguity', whereby even experts on matters relating to statistical testing can occasionally use misleading language. In fact, we shall see later that Gigerenzer and his colleagues are acutely aware of the distinctions between p's and α's. 2. An anonymous reviewer offered three (speculative) reasons why the APA Publication Manuals bestow erroneous and inconsistent advice. First, across decades of editions, some views were included at one point and not taken out when alternative views were embedded. Second, most of the APA staff do not have training in statistical methods. Third, this same staff do not seem to be overly concerned about statistical issues, as evidenced by (a) the small amount of coverage devoted to them, and (b) the lack of attention in the latest (2001) edition to revisions involving statistical content. See, in this context, Fidler (2002) . 3. Indeed, such criticism can also be found in disciplines as diverse as accounting (Lindsay, 1995) , economics (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996) , marketing (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2002; Sawyer & Peter, 1983) and wildlife sciences (Anderson, Burnham, & Thompson, 2000) . Moreover, this criticism has escalated decade by decade, judging by the number of articles published on the topic (cf. Hubbard & Ryan, 2000) . 
